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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://elib.bsu.by/handle/123456789/343530
Title: Postoptimal analysis of a finite cooperative game
Authors: Emelichev, V.
Karelkina, O.
Keywords: ЭБ БГУ::ЕСТЕСТВЕННЫЕ И ТОЧНЫЕ НАУКИ::Кибернетика
ЭБ БГУ::ЕСТЕСТВЕННЫЕ И ТОЧНЫЕ НАУКИ::Математика
Issue Date: 2021
Publisher: Vladimir Andrunachievici Institute Of Mathematics and Computer Science
Citation: BULETINUL ACADEMIEI DE S¸TIINT¸ E A REPUBLICII MOLDOVA. MATEMATICA.2021;1(95)−2(96): Pages 121–136
Abstract: We consider a finite cooperative game of several players with parameterized concept of equilibrium (optimality principles), when relations between players in coalition are based on the Pareto maximum. Introduction of this optimality principle allows to connect classical notions of the Pareto optimality and Nash equilibrium. Lower and upper bounds are obtained for the strong stability radius of the game under parameters perturbations with the assumption that arbitrary Hölder norms are defined in the space of outcomes and criteria space. Game classes with an infinite radius are defined
URI: https://elib.bsu.by/handle/123456789/343530
Licence: info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Appears in Collections:Кафедра математической кибернетики (статьи)

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