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dc.contributor.authorде Куэрто Ногерас, Карлос-
dc.identifier.citationБелорусский журнал международного права и международных отношений. — 2000. — № 1ru
dc.descriptionРаздел - "Международные отношения"ru
dc.description.abstractFollowing the fall of the Berlin Wall, and while the Central and Eastern European countries suffered the transitional shock therapy and awaited admittance to the European economic club as a way of relieving the pain of transition, the EU and its Member States became profoundly introspective and absorbed in deep introspection questioning, the project of integration itself and displacing the Community interest priorities for those of the national interests. If in Central and Eastern Europe the economic and social crisis, which followed this process of transformation, has caused a return to national identification, nationalist aggression, claims to absolute sovereignty of the nation-State and the all-consuming ethnic-nationalism, in Western Europe the multidimensional crisis within the European integration project through the concept of Political Union against a background of economic recession and unemployment, has resulted in the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam. Europe, following the initial euphoria over the fall of communism, is much too interested, preoccupied, and self-centered on its own objectives and internal problems to pay sufficient attention to the Central and Eastern European countries, and thus it is endangering political, economic and social stability within these societies and the emerging regional markets they represent. Thus, this delaying and obstructionist strategy in the face of the challenge of the EU enlargement has been carried out through different means. The first of them is by an obsessive tendency to overestimate the cost and danger of the Eastern expansion of the EU, with studies and analysis of costs and benefits which leave clear the animosity to the enlargement proposal and the fear of economic and trade competition from the former Eastern block for European industry and employment. The pressure exerted by German unification and the world recession in the beginning of the nineties seem to have obscured the benefits of the single market and to have shot the protectionists to the heart of the Union. The greater access for third countries to the market of the EU with the new transparency and the community unified legalsystem is being exchanged for a Fortress Europe mentality exemplified by the Common Agriculture Policy, by its massive anti-dumping regulations and miserly spirit and intrusiveness of Europe in the analysis of the contents, conditions and results of all the trade agreements with the Eastern candidate countries to date, despite the approval of the liberalizing trade legislation in the GATT Uruguay Round. The second strategy is the numerous list of conditions imposed by the EU in order to accept their applications to be admitted to the select club of the Union. At the European Council of Copenhagen of 1993, the EU warned that the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which wished to enter the EU, would do it when they were capable of assuming the obligations of membership, satisfying the required political and economic conditions and rejecting the establishment of any schedule to avoid the Commission or the Council. The third strategy, equally dangerous, has been to opt for an individual approximation of carrying out future enlargements of the Union, which provoked the CEEC to enter upon a dizzy race to harmonize their legislations with the Community set and thus to adopt the voluminous new European legislative corpus so as to arrive first to the admission line. This strategy has encouraged a paralysis and stagnation of the efforts to promote successfully the Central European regional economic co-operation bloc and a deterioration in the bilateral relationships among them. This lack of cooperation among the lawyers has turned out in negative total for all of them, having substantially reduced their pressure capacity on Western European economic, political and financial strategic centres over the last years. And the fourth strategy, and more important in this respect, followed by the EU to block and delay this European enlargement has been the fact, that the Union has opted for an overloaded agenda for work in the following years, so as to endanger, given the conditions set, the project of enlargement to the East. The single European currency, the negotiations for budgetary proposals for the seven-year European budget 1999—2006, the reform of the great common policies such as the CAP, the cohesion funds, the structural funds, the institutional reforms required to face the problems of the existing balance and democratic legitimacy, can all lead to the failure of the enlargement, its delay or postponement given the overload of obligations, all requiring a consensus on the model of European integration to be used, and which does not exist at present, leaving this expansion a mere public gesture of little impact. Although it is important to eliminate the illegitimatizing undemocratic heritage of the European institutional framework, but since the volume of transfer of national sovereignties towards the Community's institutions seems to strengthen the quasi-federal dimension of the Union, there are attempts to use the institutional reformist process as a means to delay and impede the speed of the eastern expansion of the European Union, which could endanger not only the democratic consolidation of the Central and Eastern European societies, but also the security and stability of the continent, and, what it is more worrying, put in danger the unity of the European integrationist project, as countries, such as Germany, Austria, Denmark, or Finland, would lose their interest for the current European building in favour of a greater bilateralism in their relationships with these Eastern neighbours, acting as free riders. This European introspection has been moulded very clearly in the successive European summits centered on the same internal questions repeated again and again, without any conclusive results, showing an egotistical vision of Europe, the irremediable decadence of the European construction steeped in an atmosphere of indecision and in a mire that surrounds the decision-taking process, where the question of the enlargement is avoided for fear of the economic and political sacrifices, the fear produced by the proliferation of heterogeneous national visions of Europe, built on differing interests and priorities — an Europe unmanageable from a political standpoint.ru
dc.subjectЭБ БГУ::ОБЩЕСТВЕННЫЕ НАУКИ::Комплексные проблемы общественных наукru
dc.titleСтраны Центральной и Восточной Европы и проблема расширения Европейского союзаru
dc.title.alternativeCentral and European Countries and the Problems of the European Union Enlargement (Carlos de Cueto Nogueras)ru
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