Logo BSU

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://elib.bsu.by/handle/123456789/28948
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorРафеенко, Денис Константинович-
dc.identifier.citationБелорусский журнал международного права и международных отношений. — 2004. — № 3ru
dc.descriptionРаздел - "Международные отношения"ru
dc.description.abstractAs a result of the USSR's collapse Ukraine became the third largest nuclear state in the world after the USA and Russia, since it had over 1900 nuclear warheads for strategic missiles. Having inherited this formidable nuclear potential of START Ukraine, however, did not inherit control over it. December 1991—February 1992 saw signing agreements within the CIS framework which determined the status of the nuclear armaments of the former USSR. Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russia committed themselves to joint development of policy concerning nuclear weapons and retained joint control over the nuclear armaments of the former USSR. The Joint Command of Strategic Forces was established. Ukraine and Belarus also pledged to join the Nuclear- Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear states. In its turn, the Lisbon Protocol to the START-1 Treaty, signed on May 23, 1992 in Lisbon, Portugal by the Foreign Ministers of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine bound Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to join the Nuclear- Proliferation Treaty as states not in possession of nuclear weapons. The policy of Ukraine concerning nuclear weapons was formed in 1991—1996 under the influence of several political groups in the country's administration, who were for or against retaining nuclear weapons. Peculiarly, they included people both from the legislative and executive branches. Ukrainian diplomacy managed to obtain some political and economic concessions from the world community in exchange for the inevitable withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of the country. Mainly, it was President Kravchuk's success. He played various groups in the parliament against each other and blackmailed Russia and the West by the threat of taking over the control of nuclear weapons, thus, forcing those latter parties into open negotiations. However, the advantages gained at these negotiations were of short-term character. On the other hand, there was an alternative to the non-nuclear status of Ukraine. But the possibility to establish at least partial control over the nuclear legacy of the CIS was lost by the government of Ukraine itself. It was because of the government of Ukraine itself, that the CIS joint strategic forces failed to be established.ru
dc.publisherМеждународное общественное объединение по изучению ООН и информационно-образовательным программамru
dc.subjectЭБ БГУ::ОБЩЕСТВЕННЫЕ НАУКИ::Политика и политические наукиru
dc.titleЯдерный фактор во внешней политике Украины (1991 - 1996 гг.)ru
dc.title.alternativeNuclear Factor in Ukrain's Foreign Policy (1991 - 1996) (Denis Rafeenko)ru
Appears in Collections:Белорусский журнал международного права и международных отношений. — 2004. — № 3

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
2004_3_JILIR_rafeyenko_r.pdf920,85 kBAdobe PDFView/Open
Show simple item record Google Scholar


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.