



PASTORALISTS AND FARMERS CONFLICT: RIGHTS OR GREEDINESS

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Pastoralists are basically migrants who do not have a permanent abode but migrates from one graze land to the other. The migration may be across international borders. Farmers on the other hand have a quasi-permanent abode. However the farmland crops are so precious to the farmers while getting grasses including crops on the farmland just for the cattle to survive is the priority of the pastoralists. This conflict of interests between the pastoralists and the farmers is a major crisis goalpost in West Africa among other violence such as ethno-religious violence. The focus of this paper is to examine the extent of damages caused due to claims of right or greediness by the pastoralists and the farmers in the society. The relative deprivation theoretical framework is used to examine the question of the place of mutual respect, peaceful co-existence and good neighbourliness. The paper concludes on the premise of respecting boundaries between the graze and the farmland and the use of modern husbandry ranching instead of a nebulous nomadic system.

Keywords: conflict; land dispute; pastoralism; rule of law; urban violence.

КОНФЛИКТ СКОТОВОДОВ И ФЕРМЕРОВ: ПРАВА ИЛИ АЛЧНОСТЬ

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Скотоводы – это в основном мигранты, которые не имеют постоянного места жительства и перемещаются с одного пастбища на другое. Миграция может происходить через международные границы. Фермеры же имеют относительно постоянное место жительства. Хотя сельскохозяйственные культуры и высоко значимы для фермеров, в то же время заготовка трав для выживания крупного рогатого скота (включая урожай на сельскохозяйственных угодьях) является приоритетом для скотоводов. Данный конфликт интересов скотоводов и фермеров является главной причиной кризисов в Западной Африке наряду с насилием, например, на этнорелигиозной почве. Основное внимание в статье уделяется изучению степени ущерба, причиняемого обществу конфликтом скотоводов и фермеров. В качестве теоретической базы используется теория относительной депривации, объектами изучения которой выступают вопросы взаимного уважения, мирного сосуществования и добрососедства. В заключении делается вывод о важности соблюдения границ между пастбищами и сельскохозяйственными угодьями и использования современных животноводческих хозяйств вместо неопределенной кочевой системы.

Ключевые слова: конфликт; земельный спор; скотоводство; верховенство закона; насилие в городах.

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Introduction

Every country with diverse ethnic groups and religious groups is bound to make several provisions for harmonious intergroup relationships. Whenever the provisions are seen from favouritism, nepotism or biased pair of eyes then the country will be in repeated crises and diverse ethno-religious violence. Africa is a continent with several ethnic and religious groups. Many diverse ethnic and religious groups are lumped together in almost incompatible confinement. This had led to various degrees of communal crises and unimaginable impending future crises. Often than not, crises erupt from such ethno-religious lines. More so when an ethnic group migrates to another location in search of “greener pasture” violent altercations are usually visible.

The migration is seen as a major trespass to the sovereignty of the receiving country due to the mal-futuristic colonial border in Africa and many developing countries [1]. A prominent ethnic group migrating is the pastoralist, nomadic from East and Central Africa towards West Africa and the Atlantic Ocean. This international migration or trans-border movement had led to Fulani herdsmen and farmers violence in Africa. This violence centres on the migration of pastoralists from various parts of Africa especially from central and Eastern Africa to West Africa and indeed Nigeria.

Unlike other parts of the world that have some level of compatible ethnic groups, the ethnically and religiously diverse states in Africa has propelled recurrent epidemic of violence over the past four decades [1; 2]. In Nigeria, the migration of the Fulani herdsmen from other countries into the hinterland for the survival of their livestock is at the peril and expense of the farm land [2]. The disagreements include over the use of land for farmland and or grazing areas and stock routes of access to water points for both animals and households among others.

There are various factors that fuel these crises, a major factor is the blur claims of rights to graze or farm by the parties. Other factors include increased competition for land motivated by desertification, climate change, human and cattle’s population growth, lack of clarity around the demarcation of pasture and stock routes, the breakdown of traditional relationships and informal agreements between pastoralists and farmers [2–4]. This has led to severe political, economic and social losses to the country.

The economic toll has also been huge. According to Mercy Corps study¹, the federal government was losing 13.7 bln US dollars in revenue annually because of herder-farmer conflicts in Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa and Plateau states. The study found that on average these four states lost 47 % of their internally-generated revenues. In March 2017 and 2018 respectively, Benue

state governor Samuel Ortom asserted that attacks by herders coming from more northerly states, and possibly also from Cameroon and Niger, had cost his state over 200 bln naira between 2012 and 2018 [5].

The focus of this work is to examine the extent of damages caused by either the right or greediness exhibited by the pastoralists and the farmers. No doubt that these conflicts had slowed down the development and economic growth of Nigeria and indeed Africa by destroying productive age groups which are invaluable assets for political growth and economic developments. It has eroded trust and social cohesion thereby reducing the maximum political and economic potential output level in Nigeria. Moreover, many pastoralist and farmer conflicts have taken a sharp turn from the right to land tussle to the right to life and existence tussles. These are seen in the group and guerrilla warfare attacks pursued along ethnic and religious lines [5]. These groups are not stranger to Nigeria because their sources have inventory [6].

Nigeria has an inventory of pastoral peoples, the Fulani, the Kanuri-related groups, the Shuwa, the Yedina and the Uled Suleiman are on top of the list [7]. The most numerous and widespread are the Fulani who have expanded eastwards from the Gambia river over the last thousand years and probably entered Nigeria in the 14th century [8]. The consequences of this were forceful interactions between all parties and considerable space for misunderstandings and protracted conflicts. However, if Fulani herders are unable to build up exchange relations with their host communities, particularly farmers, they can only survive either by settling and by flexible movement patterns that involve encountering new arable communities every year, or by intimidation of the farmers [7; 8].

Unfortunately, increased competition of pastoralists for a limited stock of grazing land has pitched the Fulani herders and wonderers against the indigenous farmers. The conflict between farmers and Fulani herdsmen has become so rampant. For instance, a total of about 15 000 people have lost their lives and properties worth billions of naira had been destroyed over a period of four decades till recent times. However, this conflict is usually attributed to environmental resource scarcity, greed, who gets what when and how and claim of right to land and its embedded resources. Saidu, a pastoralist from Wase district of Plateau state reaffirms this statement: “Our herd is our life because to every nomad life is worthless without his cattle. What do you expect from us when our source of existence is threatened? The encroachment of grazing fields and routes by farmers is a call to war... Wherever we turn we find the land reserved for our cattle to feast, taken over by farmers...

¹The economic costs of conflict in Nigeria [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/economic-costs-conflict-nigeria> (date of access: 17.08.2021).



It becomes difficult for our herd to move and graze without veering into crop fields... Once that happens, the farmers confront us and we have no option but to fight back”².

Relative deprivation theory is used to examine the question of the place of mutual respect, peaceful co-existence, discord and good neighbourliness in the central states in Nigeria. Conceptual clarifications of pastoralists’ violence and urban violence are examined, the anatomy of the states in central Nigeria is revealed

so as to assess the peculiar geopolitical nature of the region. The paper also dived into the pool of pastoralists and farmers crises in the central Nigeria state which examines the timeline of violence in the region and examines the implication for the country. The chapter goes further to assess the failed recommendations and then makes alternative suggestions. The paper concludes on the premise of respecting boundaries between the grassland and the farmland so as to prevent violence reoccurrence in central Nigeria.

Conceptual clarification

This section creates the atmosphere to explore the various notions of urban violence and pastoralists’ violence in the extant literature. This shows different perspectives which scholars held on the concept of urban violence and pastoralists’ violence.

Urban violence. It is a popular concept in social sciences. M. Harroff-Tavel [9] and O. I. Aluko [10] in their views posited that urban violence is different from violence that it is purely criminal. They opined that different forms of urban violence including social and political uprising, hunger riots, identity-based violence among ethnic or religious groups and clashes between territorial gangs, terrorism and acts of xenophobic violence directed against migrants. However, urban violence has intertwined with different forms of violence in urban areas. M. Harroff-Tavel goes further to say that “armed urban violence between groups that are generally considered as criminal (drug dealers, territorial gangs, mafia-type groups, etc.), or between those groups and government forces or private militias, raises some complex legal (and political) problems. This is particularly the case when that fighting is between groups engaged in a collective confrontation of major intensity, which testifies to a high degree of organisation” [9].

T. Gurr [11], F. A. Aremu and O. I. Aluko [12] as well opined that violence has different categories and it is a complex phenomenon. Its categories may include but not limited to the following:

- turmoil which consists of low-scale violence such as relatively spontaneous, unorganised political violence with substantial popular participation, including violent political strikes, riots, political clashes, and localised rebellions;
- conspiracy which consists of medium-scale violence such as highly organised political violence with limited participation, including organised political assassinations, small-scale terrorism, small-scale guerrilla wars, coup d’états and mutinies.
- internal war which consists of higher scale violence such as highly organised political violence with widespread popular participation, designed to overthrow the regime or dissolve the state and accompanied

by extensive violence, including large-scale terrorism and guerrilla wars, civil wars, and revolution.

A. Akinwale and A. Aderinto [13], O. I. Aluko, A. Isiaq, and F. Aremu [14] agreed that all forms of violence in urban areas constitute a serious social problem irrespective of their nomenclatures. Any form of violence that constitutes a threat to the security of lives and property of a large number of people in an urban area is considered an urban violence. This conceptualisation is based on recognition of the fact that urban violence can be more devastating compared to violence in a rural setting. Urban violence is also expressed in terms of ethnic and religious conflicts and often centred upon concerns with transgression to the urban settings norms and conducts.

S. Kunkeler and K. Peters [15] argues that urban violence is generally framed and interpreted as criminal violence. Within a context of state failure or the inability of state representatives to provide security, the lives of inhabitants of cities such as Rio de Janeiro and Johannesburg are constituted by a culture of fear that is attached to issues of crime [16]. K. Krause, R. Muggah and E. Gilgen [17] distinguish direct forms of urban violence which result in physical and psychological harm including intentional fatalities, assault and sexual violence and indirect manifestations that negatively affect other aspects of livelihoods, social relations and wellbeing. This concept agrees with the same trend of violence in general which may manifest in either the urban area or the rural area.

Pastoralists’ violence. This concept has little reference in the extant literature. This section of the paper dived into some cogent concepts of what pastoralists’ violence is. Pastoralists’ violence is a form of violence which emanates from farmland crop protection tussles by the farmers against the graze land claims of the herdsmen. This implies that the resultant violence from the clash of interest on the use of lands either for cropping by the farmers or for grazing by the herdsmen constitutes pastoralists’ violence [3; 18].

Pastoralists’ violence is also the violence that emanates from fixing the priority between the rights of

²Farmer-pastoralists’ clash leaves 32 dead [Electronic resource]. URL: <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=87525> (date of access: 17.08.2021).



animals (cattle) over the rights of humans on a piece of land. This shows the violence that results from the personal or group egocentric list of preference over another group regardless of the superior rights, land ownership rights and other traditional agreements on land uses.

In other words, pastoralist violence is the act of killing of humans, destruction of farmhouses, farmers'

personal houses, maiming or inflicting injuries on innocent humans, burning of farm produce and forcefully possessing a grassland by the pastoralists on behalf of their cattle and other herds. This is a violent act that transcends the mere struggling for the farmland but cut into the criminal act of forcefully ejecting the owners of farmland to abandon their land for the cattle to graze.

Theoretical framework

Relative deprivation. It is a theory that was born out of feelings and perceptions of individuals and groups. It was first articulated by S. Stouffer and his group [19] to explain feelings of satisfaction and perceptions on one's position in the army. The main premise of relative deprivation theory is that people generally experience dissatisfaction and resentment when their own outcomes do not match the outcomes of other people with whom they compare [11; 20]. Thus, the emergence of deprivation feelings is the result of comparative judgments, rather than being determined by the objective outcome. As a result, those who are objectively least well off are not necessarily the ones who feel most deprived [21; 22].

When taking a closer look at the different ways in which the value of one's outcomes can be assessed, a basic distinction can be made between interpersonal and intergroup comparisons. Unfavourable interpersonal comparisons may result in feelings of individual deprivation, while unfavourable intergroup comparisons may lead people to conclude that their social group is deprived, relative to other groups. This is an important distinction because egoistical (individual) and fraternal (group level) deprivation are predicted to have fundamentally different behavioural consequences [11; 23].

Fraternal deprivation is seen as an important precursor of political protest and intergroup social conflict, while the experience of egoistical deprivation has been associated with social isolation and individual maladjustment. A critique of relative deprivation theory, however, is that it does not specify the circumstances under which people are likely to interpret their situation as individuals.

F. Tougas and A. Beaton [24] also considered relative deprivation as personal, group and deprivation felt on behalf of others. The latter is the experience of the advantageous group acting for the interest of the disadvantaged group. This may be against the advantaged group's personal interest or group interest. Relative deprivation had also been used to address gen-

der disparity. M. Crosby, K. Ozawa and F. Crosby [25] opined that countries that are essentially individualistic (such as America) will easily implement affirmative action to remedy gender relative deprivation while countries that are collectivistic (such as Japan) will hardly implement affirmative action to remedy gender relative deprivation. Others that are between individualistic and collectivistic like Nigeria will only embark on selective implementation which may endanger conflicts.

Tyre burning theory. The process and sequence of conflict ensuing are explained by the tyre burning theory which was propounded by O. I. Aluko (2016). Tyre burning theory gives the indication that the burning of tyre phenomenon is the indicator of chaotic violence occurrence in a community. It is an aftermath indication or sign of chaotic violent attacks and breakdown of law and order in the society [26]. The theory focuses on the burning of substances most importantly tyres; others substances destroyed may include vehicles and other abandoned wreckages of broken shops, windows, houses and also to the extent of the killing of human beings. Also, in the process of violence leading to the burning of substances, the commuters got invoked by perceived political, economic, social or geographical favouritism, nepotism, aggrandisement, patron-client, patrimonial politics, ethnicity and negligence by the government and law enforcement agencies [11; 27].

In this paper, relative deprivation is intertwined with tyre burning theory to give a clear perspective on the rationale behind the incessant violence between the farmers and herders in Nigeria. Ethnic chauvinism, favouritism and nepotism of the dominant politically and economic favoured groups over other perceived smaller groups are most of the causes of this continuous violence. Most of the political, economic and social justice largesse meant for all the groups are prebend by the bigger groups. The result of long time relative deprivation builds up into gradual confrontation. The peaceful confrontation leads to violent altercation to the extent of burning of tyres as a symbol of violence and destruction of lives and properties.

Pastoralists and farmers crises in Nigeria

Crises are phenomena that are ubiquitous among human communities. The primary cause of crises is unequal interaction and perceived infringement on an

individual or a group's fundamental rights. The land is a common factor to all humans. The difference is the level of accessibility and values. The migration of Fu-



lani herdsmen from Central Africa to West Africa for adequate pasture due to climate change crises is a major cause of the violence over land accessibility³ [1; 3–5]. The Nigeria's land use act of 1978 granted equal rights and opportunities for Nigerians to live in any part of the country un-deterred and regards all citizens as Nigerians and not natives, unlike the previous Land tenure act of 1962 that did not spell this out [28]. This implies that the Federal government has the capacity to redraw the boundaries between any state, region, cattle routes, range lands and farmlands accordingly and envisage co-existence of various groups following due process. The Nigerian grazing reserve act of 1964 was passed for the purpose of accessing grazing lands to the pastoralists, thereby encouraging free movement and addressing the conflict which may arise from it with a plan to improve productivity and social amenities [29; 30].

The primary cause of crises between the pastoralists and the farmers is the level of accessibility to farmland. To the pastoralists, the lands are grazing terrain for their cattle while the farmers see the land as a fer-

tile ground for cropping. The pastoralist in most cases permits their cattle to pass the imaginary boundaries between the grassland and the farming land to destroy the crops which is the sweat and labour of the farmers. These usually lead to a breakdown of laws and order to the extent of killing both humans and animals (cows). A major perception of the crises is the political undertone of ethnic superiority and dominance of the Fulani groups over every other ethnic group in Nigeria. As such the political mechanisms that control the state security apparatus, monetary backups and legal statutes are skewed towards the Fulani crises. To this end, regardless of their anti-human rights activities such as killing and destruction of farmland and produce, they are hardly prosecuted or proscribed as terrorist group. These make them embolden to perpetuate all forms of atrocities against their host communities.

Another major issue leading to the crises in central Nigeria is the sporadic increase in the livestock (cows) population to the humans' population. It is shown in the table below.

Livestock and human population in Nigeria

Year	Livestock population, mln cows	Human population, mln people
1961	8	48
1970	15	57
1980	32	75
1990	50	97
2000	84	125
2008	104	151

Source: [31].

Another dimension to the causes of the crises in Nigeria is the expansion of the cultivated areas due to human population growth and daily food requirement for food security. The conflicts, through provocative claims over access rights to farmland and cattle routes, have become ubiquitous and seem to have defied solutions [32]. Since the 1980s there has been a marked expansion of cultivation of the Fadama areas. This has therefore heightened the struggle between livestock and agricultural production which results in the escalation of conflicts [33]. Hence, as the population grows, more land is being cultivated and less is available for pasture. This forced the Fulani to migrate and trample on crops cultivated by farmers.

The resultant effect is that both the farmers and pastoralists clash in fierce struggles for access to such valuable lands which, more often than not, result in increased conflicts. Social and economic factors continue to provoke violent conflicts among the Fulani pastoralists and farmers. The intensity and variations of the conflicts largely depend on the nature and type of the user groups where the herdsmen graze. These conflicts have constituted serious threats to the means of survival and livelihoods of both the farmers and pastoralists and what both groups are tenaciously protecting.

The incessant conflicts in Nigeria between Fulani pastoralists and farmers are also caused by climate change. The grasslands over time had become unfruitful

³The economic costs of conflict in Nigeria [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/economic-costs-conflict-nigeria> (date of access: 17.08.2021).



and depleted of nutrients coupled with fluctuations in rainfall, the herdsmen simply find a means for their cattle to survive. The surviving strategies include the forceful invasion of the farmland and a defence strategy of using violence against the target community. This strategy works a lot because the judiciary system which tries the cases and litigations often take a long time or is simply overlooked. Moreover, the crops destroyed

can never be replanted by the cattle or their herdsmen. This, therefore, makes the concerned communities to resort to the killing and rustling of the cattle to avenge the lost farmland. However, this rustling compensation strategy does not bring peace to the community but reprisal attacks from the herdsmen. This usually results in urban violence, destruction of lives and properties.

Effects of pastoralists and farmers crises

Every crisis in the human community does have a series of effects on the social, political and economic lives of the people. This might be of a short term effect or a long term effect. The herdsmen and farmers conflict in Central, East and West Africa and Nigeria as a case study holds critical implications for the progress of the region in particular and Nigeria in general⁴ [1–7; 29; 33–37]. There are some of the effects that the crises in the central Nigeria have both on the region and on the country as a sovereign entity.

Political instability. This is a direct consequence of any form of crisis. The political regime in the region is under threat and might collapse into a pariah or failed state. A state of emergency could also result and the whole political terrain will be shut down. Political instability makes all other governmental processes to be slowed down or stopped out-rightly. This could force the military junta to cut abruptly the democratic system to an autocratic regime.

Economical stagnation. This is the phenomenon of stagnation in the means of production and distribution of goods and services in the state. When crises are prevalent in a state, no one will be able to participate in legitimate commerce which contributes to the economy of the state at large. This means that the resources which the state needs to sustain itself will be scarce or simply unavailable and eventually the state might shut down economically. Although there might be some other illegal trade in the state such as illegal sales of small and light weapons in the state. This illegal business is a means of sustaining such violence.

Social bigotry. The social effect of violence in the community include rape, an increase in the number of internally displaced persons, refugees, theft, burglary and the death of loved ones. Individuals in the community will neglect their good social characters to adopt a survival strategy against their fellow man. The social bonds between different social groups are broken down and hatred and bitterness become evident among group interactions.

Ethnic chauvinism. This is a form of polarity along ethnic lines in the state. Each ethnic group will withdraw into the shell of their ethnicity at the expense

of the state hegemony and survival. Violence makes the individual take solace in the small groups at the expense of the large state. Therefore the crises will linger as the groups become stronger than the state. Ethnic solidarity instead of national unity leads to the disintegration of such a country.

Psychological trauma. This is the effect of disrupted thought as a result of the sudden or multiple deaths of loved ones. The psychological trauma may lead a state to loss of coordination for any political, economic or social activities. The resultant effect of psychological trauma is mental dementia. This is a situation of persistent disorder of behaviour and intellectual dysfunctions, change in personality, deterioration in personal care, impaired reasoning ability and disorientations. Individuals in such condition cannot effectively contribute to the growth of the country but instead will be seeking vengeance.

Physically weakening. These are the permanent scars of violence on the human body. There may be loss of sight causing blindness, or loss of the limbs (hands or legs). This will result in the dependency of such group of people. The economy and social activities of such people are simply strained and perhaps permanently confined to a nonproductive level. If any of such people exist as a result of a violent situation, then the economic activities of the states will be affected because the bulk of the persons who should contribute to the state growth had become dependent on others.

Educational backwardness. It is certain that in a crisis-ridden area, the schools and other institutions of learning are shut down, some structures are vandalised while others will be completely destroyed. This has a long term effect on the future of society's development. Therefore, for education to continue in these areas the structures need to be improved and secured. Moreover, with this educational backwardness, there is also a higher chance of the youth to indulge in other anti-community development vices.

Spiritually unstable. Just like the educational backwardness effect of violence in a community, there will be imbalanced and unstable spiritual commitments. This implies that the freedom of worship and association

⁴The economic costs of conflict in Nigeria [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/economic-costs-conflict-nigeria> (date of access: 17.08.2021).



formally enjoyed by the community is affected and the worshippers are apparently cut off from their collective fellowships. This is due to the fear of strategic attacks on worship centres mostly perpetrated by religious bigots faction of the warring syndicates.

Developmental haphazardness. This is a resultant effect of violence in any community. The developmental process will not be consistent. In the long run, the state will be found backward in the list of developed nations. All the indices of development will be on the negative side because the people who should build up the state are deeply divided over such matters which can be solved amicably. The limited available resources of human capital and technology which should be used

for developmental purposes will be channelled to the violence either to mitigate it or to aggravate it.

Unfavourable historical precedent. Every country with crisis-ridden records is apparently in the “black book” of history. Years after the violence, the incident will still be discussed as if it were new and fresh. This may also prevent some major investors from investing their resources into such regions and the level of development will be at a slower pace than the actual capacity the state had. Mutual suspicion and distrust may be a nurse for a long time among the groups in society. This is a negative or unfavourable historical antecedent that may result in lingered fear of interaction in the post crises period.

Conclusion

Migration in Africa especially from East and Central Africa to the West Africa had been a major problem in the continent. The primary causes of crises are relative deprivation with human or naturally caused which leads to tyre burning phenomenon. The farmers’ right and greediness of the herdsmen in the daily interaction in Africa and indeed in Nigeria may linger because of the unequal interaction and perceived infringement on individual or a group’s fundamental rights. Land is a common factor to all humans. The difference is the level of accessibility and values. However, the traditional lands in Africa are jealously guarded. The primary cause of crises between the pastoralists and the farmers is the level of accessibility to farmland or graze land. To the pastoralists, the lands are grazing terrain for their cattle while the farmers see the land as their natural inheritance and a fertile ground for cropping. The migrating nomadic herdsmen’s seldom allows the cattle to pass through the farming land thereby leading to trespassing and destroying the farmers’ crops.

The sporadic increase in number of livestock (cows) population ration to the humans’ population is a major issue leading to the crises in central Nigeria. This poses a great competition between humans and cattle over land, water and vegetations. For the pastoralists and farmers conflict in Nigeria and other countries to reduce gradually the government should take into cognisance the population growth rate and modern ranching techniques instead of the brutal nomadic pastoralism. Also, the cattle population is higher than previous years to the extent of competing with the population of humans in Nigeria thereby competing for land, food and water. There should be a ready channel

to effectively and economically dispose the cattle in such a way that will keep the cattle population relatively constant and at the same time lucrative for the herdsmen.

Therefore, industries of reputable standards should be established in strategic places where cattle products such as meat, milk, hide and skins can be processed in large quantity and high quality so as to reduce cattle population and unnecessary competitions between man and animals. Local industries should be improved to international standards so as to enhance export value for cattle products and at the same time provides employment for the people who will improve the economy. In order to achieve this, educational strategy must be employed by the government. Workable educational policy should be implemented for the nomadic with a reasonable punishment for any erring one neglecting the education. This will make the herdsmen understand the essence of human life as more valuable to cattle’s life, instead of frequent communal clashes between the pastoralists and herdsmen.

The reduction of the rampant conflict between farmers and Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria is of great importance to the food security of the country and Africa at large. Nigeria is a potential food basket for the continent. Obnoxious laws on land use must be repelled by the government so as to promote peaceful coexistence and reduce conflict altercation in the country. These measures will reduce or permanently exterminate the notion of rights or greediness exhibited by the pastoralists and or the farmers. The expected peace, trust and social cohesion required for rapid political development and economic growth will be attained.

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