

**РАЗДЕЛ 1**  
**ГОСУДАРСТВО И ПРАВО.**  
**ИСТОРИЯ. ПОЛИТОЛОГИЯ.**  
**МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ**

**Approaches to the Migrant Crisis Resolution**

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It is beyond dispute nowadays that there is a migrant crisis (also known as the refugee crisis) in the world: people escape from the countries with military conflicts inside them and migrate to the safest and nearest states. As a rule, migrants also regard these countries to be more affluent and developed. Taking into account all the above mentioned factors, European Union member states seem to be particularly attractive for potential migrants: they are developed, safe and until recently were able to accommodate and give asylum to all its seekers.

However, every country has a limited capability of asylum-seekers accommodation until the peak is reached and the crisis begins. Today no one doubts that it has happened to the EU. The expressions of the crisis can be found in every aspect of life from the reestablishment of the internal borders to the existence of the Muslim parts of the cities: the number of the asylum-seekers from these countries is so colossal that the states are not able to assimilate and integrate them into their culture. This inevitably leads to the conflicts based on the religious and national basis, cultural erosion of the native cultures.

It is obvious that the problem exists. However, the solution to it is far from being reached. In this abstract we will try to analyze the existing approaches from different angles and propose a possible solution.

The first and universal step is the creation of a single institution that will be responsible for the existing and future problems in this sphere. It should be based on the model of EUROPOL: single database, single managerial organ, cooperation with other EU institutions for a better functioning [1].

The second and the most significant step is deciding on the asylum strategy. And it causes most of the controversy. It should serve the interests of every member state and, at the same time, solve the problem with respect to the human rights and previous international agreements. As of now, there exist 5 general approaches to the problem.

1. The first strategy is the establishment of international treaties with safe third countries. By following it, EU member states prohibit a vast majority of asylum

seekers to get in the EU itself. Instead, the states conclude treaties with the safe country which refugees may use as a path to the EU, agreeing to finance a part of the expenses the country experiences based on the treaty's execution. EU – Turkey statement can be used as an example [2].

2. The second strategy is based on the sovereign equality of the states. It is a fundamental axiomatic premise of the international legal order, which was first proclaimed in 1943 [3; 4]. It foresees an equal distribution of migrants among member states. The idea is that if a state has equal rights with others, it should also have equal responsibilities. However, this strategy proved little efficiency in the face of the current migrant crisis in Europe. It is believed that one of the most important reasons for the UK leaving the EU was directly connected with the challenge of accommodating migrants [5].

3. The third strategy suggests that the distribution should mainly depend on the population of the member state. The coefficient should be mathematically calculated to determine the number of migrants for a certain number of citizens of the member state.

4. The fourth and the fifth strategies are based on the GDP: per capita and per member state. The logic here is that the GDP or, in other words, the material resources will enable the countries to accommodate more asylum-seekers because they will afford to provide more people with shelters and basic number of amenities.

Every strategy has its own positive and negative sides. Some are beneficial for one countries, and some for the other. However, the point is to find a balance.

In our opinion, the best solution would be the synergy of the third and the fourth strategies: it is rational to think that countries with a higher overall GDP and population will be able to handle the crisis more efficiently. There are two main reasons for it. The first is that the capacity of assimilation of the more populated state is much higher: it can allow in more people without the gradual extinction of the local culture. The second one is that affluent countries with their material resources have more possibilities to provide healthcare, language courses, accommodation and satisfy other basic needs of the refugees in a more efficient way.

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## **Внешняя политика Швеции во время Второй мировой войны**

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Швеция во внешней политике традиционно придерживалась нейтралитета, который формировался на протяжении длительного периода ее становления в качестве суверенного государства.

В годы Второй мировой войны задачей шведского правительства наряду с сохранением нейтралитета стало обеспечение снабжения страны необходимыми импортными товарами. В то же время Швеция рассматривалась воюющими странами как важный экспортер стратегических товаров. 7 декабря 1939 г. было подписано торговое соглашение между Швецией и Англией, предусматривавшее сохранение довоенного объема двусторонней торговли, а также 22 декабря заключено шведско-английское торговое соглашение [1, с. 489].

С началом Советско-финляндской войны (1939–1940) Швеция воздержалась от заявления о нейтралитете и заняла позицию «невоюющей» страны. Для Швеции в тот период были характерны оказание военно-материальной поддержки Финляндии и посредничество между этой страной и СССР в возобновлении переговоров [1, с. 489].

Вторжение немецких войск в Норвегию в апреле 1940 г. повлекло за собой усиление зависимости Швеции от Германии. Шведская сторона демонстрировала готовность к сотрудничеству с «рейхом», требования которого постоянно росли. Правительство Швеции приняло требование Германии о сохранении строжайшего нейтралитета [2, с. 218].

9 июля 1940 г. между Швецией и Германией заключено шведско-германское соглашение о транзите солдат и военных материалов из Германии в Норвегию и обратно. За три года действия соглашения в обе стороны было перевезено около двух миллионов немецких солдат [3, с. 474]. Данный аспект часто рассматривается историками как существенное нарушение принципов политики нейтралитета.

В июле 1940 г. также подписано новое шведско-германское торговое соглашение, направленное на расширение двустороннего товарооборота.