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SOCIO-ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF UKRAINIAN CRISIS

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This article presents the after-effect of the Ukrainian crises for the internal situation of the country, in particular a situation in the social and economic sphere and for the international relations in general. The author notes that the situation in Ukraine, which had turned into a conflict after the power shift in February, 2014, led the national economy to a deep decline, which cannot be overcome under Ukraine's own power. According to the researcher's opinion, the main problem of the implementation of Minsk agreements is the different approaches of the signed parties to the fulfillment of their obligations. The article emphasizes that the current Ukrainian crisis in many aspects turned out to be the consequence of the de facto unfinished "cold war". Mostly because of the West's efforts Ukraine had to sever the geopolitical and civilization ties with Russia and to choose the "Western project of development". This choice led the country to its current situation and highlighted an acute question about the future of the Ukrainian nationhood.

Key words: Ukraine; colored revolution; Ukrainian crisis.

СОЦИАЛЬНО-ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЕ, ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ И МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЕ ИЗМЕРЕНИЯ УКРАИНСКОГО КРИЗИСА

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Рассматриваются последствия мирового кризиса для внутреннего положения Украины, в частности состояния ее социально-экономической сферы, а также для международных отношений в целом. Отмечается, что после смены власти на Украине в феврале 2014 г. внутригосударственный конфликт привел экономику страны к глубокому упадку, выйти из которого без внешней помощи страна не в состоянии. По мнению исследователя, основная проблема в реализации минских договоренностей – это разные подходы подписавших их сторон к порядку исполнения своих обязательств. Подчеркивается, что современный украинский кризис во многом стал следствием де-факто неоконченной холодной войны. Во многом благодаря усилиям Запада Украине пришлось пойти на геополитический, а по сути, цивилизационный разрыв с Россией, сделав выбор в пользу «западного проекта развития», что и привело страну к сегодняшнему состоянию, при котором остро стоит вопрос о будущем украинской государственности.

Ключевые слова: Украина; цветная революция; украинский кризис.

On 21 November, 2013 in the center of Kiev was launched a mass protest action, which was held for several months. It started in response to the suspension of President V. Yanukovich of signing an association agreement between Ukraine and the European Union.

This action was supported by the population of the other cities of Ukraine as well. These events eventually took the form of armed confrontation, accompanied by the capture of administrative buildings, which led to a power shift on 21 February, 2014.

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This crisis has taken a leading position among the issues that has a direct impact on the European security and the entire system of international relations. It drew not only a number of serious conflicts, but also exacerbated them to the extreme. For Ukraine, the events of late 2013 – early 2014 were critical both in terms of nation-building and the definition of foreign policy priorities as well. Opting of the Kiev authorities for the project of the national identification has led to the collapse of the old foreign policy concept and approval of a new alternative by its nature [1, p. 5].

Socio-economic situation in the country after the crisis

Ukraine after the crisis is in a situation of turbulence. If in 2013 its GDP was 183 billion USD with an increase of about 4 % per year, in 2014 it was already 132 billion USD with 28 % decrease, while in 2015 the falling has increased by 10 %. Hundreds of millions of dollars every month is spent by gold and foreign exchange reserve to keep the hryvnia exchange rate, which is continuing to fall. Two years ago the course was 9.5 hryvnia for one USD, today it has grown to 26 hryvnia. The rise in prices in 2013 was almost at zero, in 2014, they increased by 25 % and in 2015 a further 43 %. Since 2013, the state debt increased from 500 to 885 billion hryvnia. The total national debt is currently estimated at 80 % of GDP. Export of Ukrainian goods in 2014 decreased by 14 % to 53 billion USD. In 2015, exports fell by 30 % from the previous year's level and amounted at 38 billion USD. This notable decline in imports occurred in the Customs Union countries, especially Russia and the

Balancing between Russia and the West during the post-Soviet period, the country dramatically changed the vector of its foreign policy and has taken a clear Euro-Atlantic course. The Ukrainian crisis has clearly exposed the shortcomings of the existing European security model based on the leading role of NATO and the peripheral status of the Russian factor. The crisis led Ukraine to a geopolitical decomposition and immersion into a conflict. Already a year old Minsk Agreement, which stopped armed actions in the south-east of the country, could not end the conflict.

EU countries as well. The unemployment rate rose from 8 to 10 %. Real wages declined by 10 % in 2014 compared with the previous year and by 20 % further in 2015 [2]. There was a large shift of the economic activity in the "informal" sector, which reduces the revenue part of the budget. A large number of people leaving to work abroad, which deprives the country not only of the working population, but also a part of active taxpayers. There is a huge outflow of capital caused by closing offices and production facilities of the foreign companies. The shale gas stir also ended up with nothing. In autumn 2015 it became known that the English-Dutch oil giant "Shell" cancelled the Yuzovsky project of the extraction of shale gas in Kharkov and Donetsk regions of Ukraine. To the list of characteristics of today's Ukraine can be added the absence of a unified legal field, engagement of proceedings, the highest level of pressure on the business, utmost level of corruption.

Minsk process

In Minsk 11–12 February, 2015 at the summit of "Normand Quartet" (Russia, Germany, France and Ukraine) after 16-hour negotiations, two documents were adopted. The first one is a "set of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements" [3], known as the Minsk-2. This document was only submitted by "Normandy Format". But it was signed by contact group, consists of representatives of Ukraine, Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and Lugansk People's Republic (LPR), Russia and the OSCE. This set of measures should facilitate the realization of the Minsk agreements reached in September, 2014 in Minsk (Minsk Protocol, 5 September, 2014 and the Minsk memorandum, 19 September, 2014). The second document is a declaration of "Normandy Quartet" leaders to support a package of measures [4]. This statement is not a subscription document. "Minsk agreements" formed the political and legal base, enabling the de-escalation of the conflict in the east of Ukraine.

In Paris 2 October, 2015 the leaders of the "Normandy Format" stated the possible spreading execu-

tion period of Minsk-2 in 2016. In Berlin 6 November heads of foreign services of Russia, Germany, France and Ukraine have agreed to postpone the implementation of "Minsk agreement" in 2016.

Now it has been more than a year. Large-scale military operations are not conducted, but many points of agreement are not adhering. Moreover we cannot speak about any breakout in the implementation of this complex of measures. Since that time, 3 points of Minsk-2 are implemented partially, and 8 of 13 conditions are not abide at all. It should recognize the deterioration of situation at all political points, and it occurs due to Kiev's attempt to change the basic conditions of it. At that time, really tangible result of Complex of measures is the cessation of hostilities, besides that there are some clashes.

We can distinguish the following main reasons associated with the implementation of the "Minsk-2". Firstly, the greatest difficulty is the 11th point: the constitutional reform. The amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution have not been made. Ukraine

does not want to assign a special status of Donbas, trying to solve the problem by the decentralization. DNR and LPR, as well as the Russian side require to define Donetsk and Lugansk regions in the 133 the article of the Constitution of Ukraine as separate areas with special status. Disruption of voting on the special status issue is justified by the Ukrainian side as the fact of absence of necessary decision votes in the Verkhovna Rada. According to the Ukrainian laws such initiative should be supported by 2 of 3 of the Rada (300 members of Parliament). It is clear: if Donbas gets a special status, other regions of Ukraine may initiate the same requirements [5].

Secondly, the 9th paragraph also is a greater complexity, concerning the recovery of full control over the state border from Ukraine. On the one hand, the economic assistance coming from Russia is vital to the unrecognized republics, so if the border control by Ukraine, it will be able to block such measures. On the other hand, in case of elections in the DNR and LNR will holding on, Ukraine gets there legitimate authority and it will be impossible to ignore it. Is it appropriate in this case to talk about the full control over the border of Kiev? – No.

Third, the Ukrainian authorities do not have a pattern that could be used for the reintegration of the inhabitants of the unrecognized republics [5].

Fourth, if the parties come to peace, Ukraine cannot already use the rhetoric about Russian aggression and thus deprive them of the opportunity to blame Moscow and personally Putin in all problems and troubles, and finally it will miss Ukraine of victimity in the eyes of civil society [6, p. 13].

Fifth, according to “a set of measures for implementation of agreements”, it is necessary to ensure the restoration of social and economic relations, in particular, to solve the problems of social benefits, tax system and the functioning of banks. Accordingly, it increases financial overhang being in tatters Ukrainian economy. Ukraine has to allocate funds for social protection for the three million people of the republic, public servants’ salaries and infrastructure rehabilitation. Before the conflict Donbas largely having in tow other Ukrainian regions. Now it is in ruin and decay [7, p. 65].

Stay with it although we can go on. Already it is clear that this agreement in its current form is not benefit. However, it is the only legitimate basis for the resolution of the Ukrainian crisis. Therefore, any unagreed attempts to make a new points in Minsk agreement or to connect the implementation of the agreed points with some additional conditions, as well as failure to comply with the agreements already fixed as scheduled, should be seen as a disruption of the peace process.

Ukrainian crisis international dimension

Ukraine is an essential element of European security. Ukrainian factor can both ensure stability in Europe by balancing the interests of Russia and the West, can also devalue the European security, undermining its internal instability, encouraging external rivalries actors, urging them to fight for influence in Ukraine. Unfolding crisis in the country proved it.

Ukrainian crisis demonstrated the crisis of the current the NATO-centric model of European security. According to its founders, this system was appealed to shape peace, stability and security in Europe. However, an attempt to draw in Ukraine in NATO provide evidence of the selectivity of the system, its bias, anti-Russian interests, that led to active opposition from Russia and the growth of international tension [8].

The nature and characteristics of the Ukrainian state, such as ethno-confessional fragmentation, encouraging civilization split of society, have led to the fact that any Ukraine’s attempt to make a geopolitical choice, to wit attractive only one geopolitical centers contributed to the growing threat to its national security, meaning a geopolitical decomposition of state. The only way of Ukraine’s development in the conditions of the state dissimilarity would be cautious moving forward and maneuver among the major centers of influence, where Ukraine is lodged between.

Having political will and commitment to restore stability and security in Europe, the best form of Uk-

rainian interests would be an agreement of Russia, the US and the EU, with the participation of official Kiev about a reasonable and sustainable balance of interests, which can be defined as “three no”. Ukraine should be independent, neutral and not unitary. Thus, it is managed to ensure relative equidistance. However, this is possible only if Russia, the US and EU are ready to abandon the rhetoric about the “Eurasian” or “European” choice of Ukraine.

However, the leadership of the Ukrainian state and external actors is not enough wisdom and the concept of foreign policy of Ukraine, emerged as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and at the turn of 2013–2014. It is not just exhausted, but failed. The attempt to keep a foot on both camps failed for the whole Kiev’s foreign policy. Largely due to the efforts of the West Ukraine had to geopolitical, and indeed civilization gap with Russia, choosing the “western development project”. As a result, in Ukraine there was broken balance of power forming for decades. There has been a unacceptable for Russian interests misbalance in favour of the depth of Ukraine’s relations with the West. The irresponsibility of the Ukrainian authorities, condoned to external forces by their actions, enabled them to implement their own plans.

It seems that the modern Ukrainian crisis largely was the result of a de facto unfinished “cold war”. West considered himself as a winner in it and because non-

despite protests from Russia, began to spread the impact on countries of the former Soviet bloc through the expansion of NATO and the EU. The endpoint of this was the fight for the CIS space. Penetrating there, the West tried to completely secure their geopolitical preferences, formed after the collapse of the USSR. Experience

of Ukraine assures that the scenario launched by the United States in the CIS region, is designed to solve the main geopolitical, political-economic and military-strategic goal, which one is the elimination of Russia as a fledgling and independent player in the conditions of formation of a new polycentric world order.

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