

и тем самым каллиграфия принимает важное религиозное значение: фактически искусство письма в исламе сакрализуется. Это можно вывести также и из того, что искусство каллиграфии сформировалось благодаря составлению и записи единого Корана.

Таким образом, можно сделать вывод, что запрет на изобразительное искусство, выведенный из Корана и объясненный знатоками шариата, пресек развитие мусульманского изобразительного искусства (в первую очередь живописи и скульптуры). Но, вместе с тем, колоссальное значение в исламском искусстве принимают каллиграфия и архитектура. Фактически каллиграфия берет на себя функцию изобразительного искусства, она поглощает его: в связи с запретом на изображение людей, особенно пророка Мухаммада, только каллиграфия может передать некий зрительный образ пророка (о словесных описаниях, сделанных его современниками, здесь речь не идет), который может использоваться в убранстве мечети, книгах или в домах верующих. Каллиграфия также играет большую роль в украшении мечети наравне с коврами и орнаментом, фактически приобретая сакральное значение.

THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM AND THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT

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Human is entirely a God's creation from the theological point of view. It is a weak creature which aims at getting into the Paradise (ġanna) and avoiding the inferno (ġahannam). A man got a power of naming the animals, rational thinking, distinguishing goodness and badness, capability to make a choice between them¹. A man rules the world in behalf of God. Is a man prepared to accomplish the mission given to him? In the Islamic theology, the angels tried to put God up to not entrust this mission to a man because of his weaknesses. Islamic thinkers stumble across the issue of predestination and badness. On the one hand, one part of Quranic message seems to indicate that a man is a free-will being, equipped with responsibility and able to

¹ *Wąs, A. Człowiek w islamie. Antropologia teocentryczna, [in.] / A. Wąs; G. Kucza, G. Wita (red.), Antropologia miejscem spotkania i dialogu międzyreligijnego, Katowice:Księgarnia św. – Jacka, 2008. – P. 88.*

follow God's path. On the other hand, there are Quranic verses seems to say that human actions are determined totally by God¹.

The Sharia Law marks the line for moral behavior for Muslims. The specialists in the interpretation of this law are called the muftis. They are people who make a law opinions for believers. It is necessary to stress that the *fatwas* have not a normative character in Sunni Islam but a consultative. They are mandatory for Shia Muslims but valid until the death of Shia *mujtaheed* ('muğtahid) who gave them².

The Quran, the main source of law in Islam, controlled the life of the umma, the Muslim community, in the beginning of its existence. On the other hand, the Quran does not broach a lot of problems like ethical problems caused by technological development.

In the 8th century Islamic scholars decided to look for indications on making law in the *Sunnah*, a collection of transmissions about life of the Prophet. The Sunnah is the second most important part of law in Islam. Presently, four schools of law, the *mazhabs*, could be distinguished in Sunni Islam: (1) shafiite, (2) hanbali, (3) malic and (4) hanafite. Every believer is able to choose one of them according to his world-view. If mufti's fatwas are not acceptable for him, he is able to change his law school affiliation. These days, there is a permission to consolidate the rules descended from different mazhabs (*talfiq*). The most important difference between the mazhabs is an attitude to *the sources of law*. All of them are agreed that the Quran is unquestionable basis but they differentiate from each other by the methods of executing the law³.

The Islamic discuss on moral value of human actions is strictly connected to the problem of God's omnipotence which could be formulated in that way: how to square the omnipotence of God with human freedom of action? This problem is also known in Western philosophical tradition but has another context.

Mu'tazilla's doctrine claims that every human being is free in its action, what is connected to moral responsibility in Islam. The Mutazillis maintain that this freedom is a logical result of the *adl* – the God's fairness. If a man has not freedom of actions that means that God is not fair. The last thesis is not acceptable. The other argument for that is a derivative of Islamic eschatology – human freedom is

¹ Ibid. – P. 90–91.

² Danecki, J. Podstawowe wiadomości o islamie / J. Danecki. – Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, 20072. – P. 218–219.

³ Ibid. – P. 212.

the only rational explanation of the existence of the Paradise and the Gehenna¹.

There are some *ayas*, the verses in the Quran which broach the issue of God's omniscience:

[59] And with Him are the keys of the unseen; none knows them except Him. And He knows what is on the land and in the sea. Not a leaf falls but that He knows it. And no grain is there within the darknesses of the earth and no moist or dry [thing] but that it is [written] in a clear record.

(Q VI : 59²).

If a human has freedom of action, how to reconcile this claim with a thesis that God knows human's every move before it is done? The Mu'tazilis answer that question in the following way: the God's will (*māshā'allāh*) refers to a human in a metaphysical sense – as to the being – not to an act. The human actions do not mean the God's acts of will (*irada*) nor his orders (*amr*) but his eternal intent and creative genius.

A human is free in his act. According to this, in mu'tazilis theory the principles of God's threat (*wad*) and God's fairness (*wa'id*) are being accomplished. If a man is obedient, he is prized. Moral warrant (*al-amr bi-al-maruf*), according to mu'tazilis, refers not only to an individual but to whole Muslim community. It means that *umma* has an obligation to make proper living conditions possible for every Muslim³.

The Mu'tazili school gave the beginning for another philosophical school: The Asharits, founded by Abu al-Hasan Ali Ibn Isma'il al-Ashari (873–935). In the matter of human freedom al-Ashari has rejected the principle of human's creative power (*qudra*). He concerned it as dangerous for God's creative power and possibility of making polytheism (the *shirk*).

In Ashari's attitude called 'occasionalism', the connection between the cause of action, a human, and a result of action – an act – is an illusion. No one but God has an eternal power (*qudra qadīma*) which everything makes into existence. A man does not have a power like this⁴.

¹ *Corbin, H. Historia filozofii muzułmańskiej*, trans. K. Pachniak / H. Corbin. – Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, 2009. – P. 103.

² The Noble Quran [Electronic resurse] / Mode of access: <http://quran.com/6>. – Date of access: 15.02.2015.

³ *Ibid.* – P. 104–105.

⁴ *Shihadeh, A. The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī* / A. Shihadeh. – Brill: Leiden-Boston, 2006. – P. 14.

Instead of this, Ashari has introduced a concept of *kasb*. This idea is an interesting solution for the problem of human freedom and his moral responsibility for actions. *Kasb* means, literally, 'the acquiring'. According to Ashari, it means that a man has no creative power but 'the acquiring power' of everything what God introduced into existence.

Al-Bāqillāni adds being obedient (*tā'a*) or disobedient (*ma'shiya*) is all what a human can do, from the metaphysical point of view. Ashari rejected this thesis¹. Regardless of the choice made by a man – being obedient or disobedient – God creates the effect of that choice so He's the main perpetrator (*mu'aththir*) in a metaphysical sense but not moral. Therefore it is possible to accept the claim on God's creative power and human's moral responsibility for actions.

According to another Ashari'ite scholar, Abu Ishaq al-Isfara'ini, a human act is a result of combination of human's and God's power². In his view, the human power can not create anything without God's help (*mu'īn*). If both are united, then an action happens.

The theory of *kasb*, regardless of its variations, is still the most popular solution of the problem between human freedom of act and his moral responsibility in Islamic thought.

Al-Razi is one of the most interesting Islamic philosophers because he is the first who combined two opposite strands of Islam: *kalam* – speculative theology and *falsafa* – Islamic philosophy based of Greek scriptures. Although al-Ghazali was the first who met those two streams, al-Razi was the first who made a synthesis of them³.

The main problem broached by al-Razi was the question: is a man-perpetrator determined (*mujbar*) or he has a free choice (*mukhtār*)? Al-Razi rejects the *mu'tazilis* thesis, that a man is not determined by God. Al-Razi's theory claims that an action happens when human's creative power arise together with a motivation. If so, a motivation for action relies on a previous motivation. Finally, all motivations rely on the first motivation made by God⁴. If so, a man is determined in action and has no freedom of choice.

¹ *Shihadeh, A.* The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī / A. Shihadeh. – Brill: Leiden-Boston, 2006. – P. 15.

² *Ibid.* – P. 15–16.

³ *Ibid.* – P. 1.

⁴ *Ibid.* – P. 29.

Al-Razi argues also that all cognitive states of a man are determined both by internal and external factors. He singles out the following internal factors: (1) the differences between the quiddities of human souls, (2) the differences in temperance, (3) a physiognomical differences between people. The external factors are: (1) the place of living, (2) the expectations of benefits or damages caused by the commitment to beliefs, (3) theoretical exercises. These factors shape a character; the external factors shape needs and motives¹. All of them, both external and internal, are independent of human's control so a man relies on them.

Nowadays, two main philosophical streams could be distinguished in Islam. The first, conservative, is represented by Ismail al-Faruqi. Al-Faruqi (1921–1986) is a Palestinian scholar, studied in Harvard, McGill and al-Azhar. He claims that every human is equipped with special sense called *dīn al-fitrah*. Thanks to that, a man is able to recognize his Creator and the religion, the one religion given to the humanity – Islam. In his view, human freedom is reflected in his possibility of coming back to God's path².

The second strand, the modern, is promoted by Mohamed Talbi. Talbi is a Tunisian scholar, studied in Paris-Sorbonne. He maintains that freedom of action is the basis of human nature, what is, according to him, indicated in the Quran:

[256] There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion. The right course has become clear from the wrong. So whoever disbelieves in Taghut and believes in Allah has grasped the most trustworthy handhold with no break in it. And Allah is Hearing and Knowing (Q II : 256).

In the verse above there is not compulsion in the religious sphere of life. That leads up to the conclusion that freedom is a metaphysical feature of human being.

ОСОБЕННОСТИ КОНЦЕПТУАЛИЗАЦИИ СУДЬБЫ В ИНДОИРАНСКОЙ КУЛЬТУРЕ

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Проблема судьбы в мировоззренческом плане может быть прочитана как вопрос о границах, в пределах которых человек спосо-

¹ *Shihadeh, A. The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī / A. Shihadeh. – Brill: Leiden-Boston, 2006. – P. 31.*

² *Wāṣ, A. – Idem, 365.*