Возможности реализации Европейской конвенции о защите прав человека и основных свобод в практике Конституционного Суда Республики Беларусь и национальных судов

Abstract

A unique characteristic of Korean modern economy is trade and industrial groups (TIGs) testifying to a high level of industrial monopolization. Chebols are multibranch conglomerations of industrial companies with specialized trade companies providing sales strategies. In contrast to financial and industrial groups, chebols do not include banks and other financial and credit institutions. As for their relations with the government, it is chebols in the first place which hold the responsibility to realize macro- and foreign economic policy of the state, to be more precise — the plans of economic development. Another specific feature is that Korean TIGs are based on family capital. Therefore it is not surprising that Korean researchers characterize chebols as "groups of formally independent companies in certain families' ownership and under single administrative and financial control". The relations between the government and chebols can be characterized as partnership. In the 1960s the government gave substantial subsidies to chebols contributing to their monopolistic concentration. In the 1970s the state gave massive support, orienting them to accelerated development in heavy and chemical industries. In the 1980s it directed their business activity to rapid widening of export potential and expansion to the international sales market. During this period private exporters got access to large credit resources at low rates. This opportunity increased their possibility to buy foreign equipment and other resources for export production and to reduce business risks and uncertainty in their commercial activity. As a result of the state support chebols started to play the key role in the industrial development and to dominate in the national economy of South Korea. Chebols growth happened greatly due to the realization of the state programmes of import substitution and large-scale construction and to the cost benefits system with state support: chebols got nearly 75 % of bank loans to the private sector in late 1970s—early 1980s. The middle of the 1990s revealed large creditor indebtedness and low profitability of many investment projects. In 1996 twenty of 30 biggest chebols had a rate of profit to the invested capital lower than cost of capital. As a result, in the end of the 1990s the government and the IMF developed a programme of corporate and financial business restructuring. The IMF rendered urgent financial aid to South Korean economy and the governmental commission on business rehabilitation in 1998—2000 implemented the given state programme. The role of the biggest chebols in South Korean economy remains dominant. Therefore the government of the new president Kim Dae-jung pursues astringent policy aimed at the restriction of economic power and concentration of capital of conglomerates.