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dc.contributor.authorДовгань, Елена Фёдоровна-
dc.date.accessioned2013-01-14T09:27:44Z-
dc.date.available2013-01-14T09:27:44Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.citationБелорусский журнал международного права и международных отношений. — 2004. — № 1ru
dc.identifier.urihttp://elib.bsu.by/handle/123456789/28767-
dc.descriptionРаздел "Международное право" - рубрика "Вопросы теории"ru
dc.description.abstractAccording to the Charter of the United Nations the U.N. Security Council bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council, however, stays sometimes inactive because of controversy among its members. States may thus invoke insufficient efficacy of the S.C. as the basis for actions by the decision of other U.N. organs (Korea crisis 1950, Congo 1961), for collective or individual self-defense. States also try to justify the use of individual coercive measures referring to the necessity to enforce Security Council resolutions (military action in Afghanistan 2001, Iraq 2003). At present the possibility to act "on the advice" of the Security Council in the case of its inactivity or insufficient efficacy is alleged on the following grounds: 1. Authorization of the S.C. to use "all necessary means". 2. Recognition by the S.C. of the existence of a threat or breach of international peace and security. 3. Authorization of the S.C. to take action in self-defense. 4. Enforcement of earlier resolution of the S.C. 5. Other justifications. The present article considers the status of the above-mentioned justifications without the explicit authorization by the U.N. Security Council in the context of the principle of non-intervention into the domestic affairs of states. The study allows to make the following conclusions. Whenever the system of the collective security provided for by the U.N. Charter doesn't function, the Security Council carries out its enforcement capacity by authorizing individual states or international organizations to act. This enforcement activity doesn't constitute intervention into the domestic affairs of states only in so far as it is accomplished in accordance with the authorization of the Council and ceases as soon as the purpose of the sanction is achieved. Other justifications (for example, recognition by the S.C. of the existence of a threat or breach of international peace and security, breach of obligations provided for in the S.C. resolutions, reference to the right of individual and collective self-defense, threat by the severest consequences) constitute no basis for the unilateral enforcement of the rulings of resolutions and therefore break the principle of non-intervention into the domestic affairs of states as well as the prohibition to use force or the threat of force in international relations. Inactivity or insufficient efficacy of the U.N. Security Council cannot be viewed as an authorization to resort to unilateral military measures either.ru
dc.language.isoruru
dc.publisherМеждународное общественное объединение по изучению ООН и информационно-образовательным программамru
dc.subjectЭБ БГУ::ОБЩЕСТВЕННЫЕ НАУКИ::Политика и политические наукиru
dc.subjectЭБ БГУ::ОБЩЕСТВЕННЫЕ НАУКИ::Государство и право. Юридические наукиru
dc.titleОбязательность резолюций Совета Безопасности ООН в контексте невмешательства во внутренние дела государствru
dc.title.alternativeThe Building Character of the UN Security Coucil Resolutions in the Context of the Non-intervention Principle (Elena Dovgan)ru
dc.typeArticleru
Располагается в коллекциях:Белорусский журнал международного права и международных отношений. — 2004. — № 1

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