When we use one speech act rather than another, and leave our hearer to work out the meaning we intend, we are dealing with indirect speech acts. Someone using an indirect speech act wants to communicate a different meaning from the apparent surface meaning; the form and function are not directly related. Thus a declarative form such as «I was going to get another one», or «You could get me a tuna and sweetcorn one» might have the function of a request or order, meaning «Get me one.» Similarly, an interrogative form such as «Could you get me a tuna and sweetcorn one please?» or «Would you mind getting me one?» has the function of a request or order, and «Can I get you one while I’m there?» can be taken as an offer. Finally, an imperative form such as «Enjoy your bun» functions as a statement meaning «I hope you enjoy your
bun»; «Here, take this one» can have the function of an offer, and «Come for a walk with me after the lunch» serves as an invitation [3, p. 19].

As to how to analyze indirect speech acts, there are roughly three approaches. The first is to assume the existence of a dual illocutionary force (as proposed by J. Searle). On this assumption, indirect speech acts have two illocutionary forces, one literal or direct, and the other nonliteral or indirect. While the literal force is secondary, the nonliteral force is primary. Next, whether an utterance operates as an indirect speech act or not has to do with the relevant felicity conditions. For example, «Can you pass the salt?» both infringes the felicity condition for a question and queries the preparatory condition for a request. This explains why it can function as an indirect speech act [4, p. 1005]. According to J. Searle, because a speaker’s performing and an addressee’s understanding an indirect speech act always involves some kind of inference, the question is how this inference can be computed. Searle’s suggestion is that it can be computed along the general lines of the rational, cooperative model of communication articulated by P. Grice. One interesting characteristic of indirect speech acts is that they are frequently conventionalized. This can be illustrated by the fact that of various, apparently synonymous linguistic expressions, only one may conventionally be used to convey an indirect speech act («Are you able to pass the salt?» and «Do you have the ability to pass the salt?»).

A second, rather similar, approach is due to D. Gordon and G. Lakoff. In their analysis, there are inference rules called ‘conversational postulates’ that reduce the amount of inference needed to interpret an indirect speech act. Thus, in the case of «Can you pass the salt?», if the interpretation as a question cannot be intended by the speaker, then the utterance will be read as being equivalent to his or her having said «I request you to pass the salt.», thus resulting in the performance of the indirect speech act of requesting. The conversational postulates proposed by D. Gordon and G. Lakoff can be seen as another reflection of the conventionality of indirect speech acts. As to the similarities and differences between Searle’s and Gordon and Lakoff’s analyses, the major similarity is that both accounts assume that the interpretation of indirect speech acts involves inference as well as conventionality; the major difference concerns the question of balance, namely, how much of the work involved in computing an indirect speech act is inferential and how much is conventional [4, p. 1006].

There is also the idiom model. In this model, utterances like «Can you pass the salt?» are semantically ambiguous, and the request interpretation constitutes a speech act idiom that involves no inference at all. «Can you pass the salt?» is simply recognized as a request, with no question being perceived. This is the position taken by J. Sadock. There are, however, problems with this analysis, too. One is that it fails to capture the fact that (in contrast to what is the case for idioms) the meaning of an indirect speech act can frequently (at least in part) be derived from the meaning of its components; in addition, these would-be ‘idioms’ turn out to be quite comparable cross-linguistically
A further problem is that in the idiom model, an interpretation that takes into account the literal meaning or the direct illocutionary force of an indirect speech act is not allowed. This, however, leaves some speech examples unexplained (A: Can you pass the salt? B: Yes, I can. (Here it is)) [4, p. 1006].

Indirect speech acts are part of everyday life. They are often used for reasons of politeness. In English, for instance, we normally avoid the imperative except in specific circumstances (of great intimacy; in the military; in addressing small children; or in situations of imminent danger). So, «Can you turn the radio down?» addressed to an adolescent is almost certainly a polite way of avoiding the imperative. Without that context, we cannot be certain: if addressed to a disabled person, it may be a question about physical capacity, and thus a direct speech act. Questions have many different functions according to context; it is up to our pragmatic experience to interpret them appropriately. This is not usually a difficult problem, since most of these are fixed collocations which occur in predictable situations. It is part of our experience as members of a speech community to interpret them appropriately [2, p. 19].

Speech acts might be seen as a prototypically pragmatic phenomenon in the sense that they challenge the notion that there is a one-to-one correspondence between a form and its function. It is simply not possible to argue that interrogative sentences have a single function. In fact the function of an interrogative sentence when used as an utterance crucially depends on an essentially pragmatic phenomenon, how the context assists the addressee in determining what is meant by what is said. Each of the participants of communication has his or her own aim and, accordingly, exerts his or her influence upon the partner. Actual influence is exerted by a whole series of utterances of a participant, or a communicative partner.

The possible aims of the communicant in the dialogue are summarized in the matrix of the communicant proposed by M.K. Vetoshkina in 1991. The matrix includes five parameters, each having two meanings, namely, yes or no. The parameters are:

- the relative status of the communicants;
- attitude to the information, which means information relevant for the activity, whether the information the participant possesses is sufficient for performing the activity;
- attitude to the result of the activity, which means whether the participant considers the result to be positive for him or her;
- attitude to the activity, which means whether the participant is authorized to perform the activity;
- attitude to regulation of the activity, which means whether the participant has the authority to regulate the activity [1, p. 50 – 51].

The choice of the form of speech acts depends on these parameters. The aim of the participant who starts the dialogue and is termed the initiator is to
turn those parameters of his or her partner that have the negative meaning into positive using appropriate utterances. To achieve this aim the initiator chooses the parameter which is most crucial for the activity and deduces those that may help to make the crucial parameter positive.

**Literature**