Territorial policies within the Orthodox Church may be called geoecclesiology. Historically, geopolitics of states and geoecclesiology of the Church demonstrated their ability either to be mutually supportive and enforcing, or to pursue conflicting goals. It would be an oversimplification to see the Orthodox Church as inevitably assisting states in their geopolitical enterprises. The situation in Moldova, both today and historically, provides an opportunity to see the dynamics of geoecclesiastical situation and how it correlates (or not) with the current state of geopolitical affairs.

**Geoecclesiology in the Republic of Moldova after independence**

On 22 October 1991 the Holy Synod declared that the dissipation of the country should not entail break of canonical unity and stressed that «the borders of the Patriarchate not necessarily should coincide with state borders»\(^1\). Subsequently partial autonomy within the Moscow

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Patriarchate was granted to Orthodox Churches in Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia and Moldova.

On 8 October 1992 an assembly of the Moldovan clergy decided to stay within the Moscow Patriarchate. However, a group of clerics decided to separate. To admit them, the Romanian Church proclaimed the restoration of its Bessarabian Metropolitanate on the territory of Moldova headed by a former ROC bishop Petru (Paduraru). This decision contradicts the universally recognized canonical principle that there must be no administrative structures of one local church on the canonical territory of another (also known as «one bishop in a city»). Normally, in case there are ethnic communities in need of specific liturgical and communication language on the territory of a Church, they form specific parishes within its jurisdiction with priests speaking the language-in-question. For example, within the Georgian Orthodox Church there are parishes with Slavonic liturgy and the Russian language for confession. However, the Romanian Church preferred not to follow this common pattern of resolving ethnolinguistic issues.

1994 Thomos of Patriarch Alexii II makes the Moldovan Orthodox Church self-governed by its own Sobor (Assembly of clerics and laypeople)1. Nevertheless, its decisions are to be ratified by the Patriarch of Moscow and the Holy Myrrh is also given by the Moscow Patriarchate (the latter designates subordinated position of a recipient church). Staying within the jurisdiction of the ROC does not imply that the Church of Moldova must use Slavonic for liturgy. In fact, most parishes in Moldova are currently using Moldovan (Romanian), or Moldovan with Slavonic insets. Slavonic is used in parishes consisting of ethnic minorities (Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauzi, etc.). The Moldovan Church of the Moscow Patriarchate venerates Romanian saints born in Bessarabia. The main difference between a parish of the Moscow Patriarchate and a parish of the Metropolitanate of Bessarabia is not the language, but the New Calendar and the absence of special prayers for Patriarch Kirill.

In the first years of independence, the leadership of Moldova was indifferent to the ecclesiastical conflict. In the end of the 1990s, however, the authorities started to decline requests to register the Statute of the Metropolitanate of Bessarabia. In 2001 the Communist

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party came to power and declared that the Moldovan Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is the only legal successor of all the previously existing bishoprics on the territory of Moldova. The 1993 Statute of the Moldovan Church also indicates that it holds all church property including what was built or restored in the period of Romanian occupation as a part of the Mission in Transnistria. The Metropolitanate of Bessarabia has to build its churches anew.

The Communist government of Moldova understood Romanian ecclesiastical expansion as a threat to its own authority. Finally, the Metropolitanate of Bessarabia had to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights. As a result, the Republic of Moldova was fined for violating religious freedom and had to register the Metropolitanate in July 2002.

The new government, that replaced the Communists in 2009, supports unification with Romania in the long-run. A vague perspective for political unification is compensated by successful building a single cultural space for Romania and Moldova. The Romanian Church (as well as in 1918-40 and 1941-44) became one of the main instruments for spreading Romanian cultural influence. It is not, of course, the only instrument. Romania contributes a lot into state education system in Moldova (for example, 'History' textbooks are printed in Romania) and provided for 2013\14 academic year 5500 stipends for Moldovan students to study at Romanian universities and high schools (5000 stipends for the previous year). Romanian citizenship and passports are now available for all descendants of people, who used to live on the territories occupied by Romania independently of their linguistic and ethnic status.

The position of the Metropolitanate of Bessarabia in Moldova is not very strong. Ethnic minorities support neither the idea of unification with Romania, nor the Metropolitanate. The New Calendar makes the Romanian Church unacceptable for the Moldovan monastics and rural laity. At the same time, the younger generation – graduates of Romanian educational institutions – may rather see themselves parishioners of the Romanian Patriarchate. It seems that the Metropolitanate of Bessarabia pins most of its hopes on young people. For example, it provides 'Religion' textbooks for Moldovan schools where religion is taught since 2010 (the Moscow Patriarchate was not able to prepare such textbooks).

**Geoecclesiology in Ukraine and the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic**

In 1995 the Metropolitan of Bessarabia Petru Paduraru was granted a specific title of Exarh al Plaiurilor (virtually: Exarch of the [New]
Lands). He has a right to establish new parishes for Romanian Orthodox communities existing outside the Republic of Moldova. It is assumed that such communities unite ethnic Romanians needing liturgy and pastoral assistance in their native language. Since Romania does not recognize Moldovans as a separate group (only as a regional subgroup of Romanians), this may also mean communities of ethnic Moldovans.

In 2007 Daniel, the Metropolitan of Moldova and Bucovina (meaning, Romanian Moldova and Southern Bucovina) was elected as the new Patriarch of Romania. His interest in expanding his church eastwards on 24 October 2007 resulted in establishing three new bishoprics of the Metropolitanate of Bessarabia in Moldova and Ukraine instead of those existing in 1918–1940 and 1941–1944:

The Bishopric of Beltsi (to replace the Bishopric of Khotyn); the episcopal see is located in Beltsi (Moldova).

The Bishopric of Southern Bessarabia (to replace the Bishopric of Belgorod-Dnestrovski); the episcopal see is located in Cantemir (Moldova).

The Bishopric of Dubossary and all Transnistria (to replace the Mission in Transnistria); the episcopal see is theoretically located in Dubossary (the self-proclaimed Transnistrian Moldovan Republic).

Petru Paduraru expressed a hope that in a favorable time the sees of the new bishoprics would move to the proper Ukrainian cities (Khotyn, Izmail and Belgorod-Dniestrovski) and that their location in Moldova is provisional. This was understood by the Russian Orthodox Church as intent to violate its canonical territory (namely, the Odessa and Chernivtsy Oblasts of Ukraine and the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic). The Romanian Church justifies its actions by the fact that there are ethnic Romanians living in Ukraine (not to mention the Transnistrian Republic) and needing liturgy, confession and spiritual guidance in the Romanian language. The Romanian Church refuses to consider its activities as violation of canonical territory and insists that communities of ethnic Romanians of the former Soviet Union are free to choose their canonical jurisdiction independently.

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Cultural and political situation in the Ukrainian regions with a significant number of ethnic Romanians\Moldovans seems different (See Table 1). Historical Boudjak – the Odessa Oblast – was never part of Romania and stayed much longer under the Soviet rule than Northern Bucovina. The local Moldovan population mostly distinguishes itself from the Romanians as an ethnic group. As a result, the number of those who identify themselves as Romanians here is about 700 people (in 2001)\(^1\). As for historical Bucovina (the Chernivtsi Oblast), much more people here identify themselves as ethnic Romanians, claim Romanian passports and send their children to Romanian universities. Romanian consulate in Chernivtsi is unofficially reported to give away 100 thousand Romanian passports to Ukrainian citizens, but no reliable data is available (double citizenship is forbidden in Ukraine).


In the Chernivtsi Oblast there is a slight increase in the percentage of ethnic Romanians with subsequent decline of the number of ethnic Moldovans. Most likely, people simply change their self-identification: some of those calling themselves Moldovans in the Soviet time, switched to Romanian identity, providing thus extra 14.2 % of ethnic Romanians, as indicated in table 1.

While the number of ethnic Romanians in the Chernivtsi Oblast grows, no parishes of the Metropolitanate of Bessarabia are reported to exist there. Romanian cultural influence is spread not with the help of ecclesiastical bodies, but via cultural societies, educational opportunities for the youth, etc. The needs of Romanian parishes are satisfied in a canonically approved way: they are using the Romanian language for liturgy and everyday communication. What may also have impact is that Northern Bucovina since 1928 was part of the Metropolitanate of Bucovina, not of Bessarabia.

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Table 1

Ethnic Moldovans and Romanians in Ukraine in accordance with the 2001 census (the only one ever held)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic of Ukraine</th>
<th>Absolute number</th>
<th>2001, %</th>
<th>1989, %</th>
<th>2001\1989 ratio, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moldovans</td>
<td>258,6</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>79,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>151,0</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>112,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Odessa Oblast (Boudjak)      |                 |         |         |                     |
| Moldovans                    | 123,7           | 5,0     | 5,5     | 85,6                |
| Romanian                     | no data         | no data | no data | no data             |

| Chernivtsi Oblast (Northern Bucovina) |               |         |         |                     |
| Moldovans                      | 67,2            | 7,3     | 9,0     | 79,5                |
| Romanian                       | 114,6           | 12,5    | 10,7    | 114,2               |

In the Odessa Oblast, where few people identify themselves as ethnic Romanians, the Church became the primary tool for spreading Romanian cultural influence. In 2014 two parishes belonging to the Metropolitanate of Bessarabia are reported to exist in this region. In 2003 the first Romanian «autonomous parish» of Sts. Peter and Paul was registered in the village of Kamyshtovka (Izmail region, Odessa Oblast), mostly populated by ethnic Moldovans and called Hagi Curda before 1947. On 16 July 2011 Petru Paduraru consecrated a church for this parish, now coexisting with a church of Sts Peter and Paul belonging to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in the same village. An unregistered Romanian parish also exists in a Moldovan village of Utkonosovka (Erdek-Burnu).

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate perceives the emergence of Romanian parishes on its canonical territory not as an issue between Churches, but as a geopolitical challenge to be responded by state authorities. For example, responding the foundation of the parish in Kamyshtovka, Agaphangel, the Metropolitan of Odessa and Izmail, sent a letter to the president of Moldova Vladimir Voronin, asking him to call back the registration of

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1 Stratulat, N. Pravoslavnaya Tserkov v Moldavii v kontekste istorii moldavsko-rumynskikh tserkovnykh otnoshenii v XX veke / N. Stratulat. – Sankt-Peterburg, 2010. – P. 250.
the Bessarabian Metropolitanate. In 2008 Onuphrios, the Metropolitan of Chernovtzy and Bucovina, addressed Voronin with a similar request.

The Ukrainian state also considers Romanian influence on its territories a geopolitical threat, although not very urgent. Romania never expressed official territorial claims on Bucovina or Boudjak. However, it already initiated a territorial dispute with Ukraine about the Zmeinyi Island (Serpent Island) in the Black sea and delimitation of continental shelf. In 2004 this case was presented by Romania to the International Court of Justice. Having this in mind, the Ukrainian leadership cannot help remaining vigilant about possible Romanian complaints in the future.

The Romanian Bishopric of Dubossary exists only on paper. Establishing a special ecclesiastical unit for Transnistria was perceived in the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic as a threat to state security. A diocesan assembly immediately condemned it as an attempt of the Romanian authorities to separate the Orthodox on the basis of their language and blood1. Since the government of the self-proclaimed republic prevents any Romanian presence on its territory, Romanian cultural and ecclesiastical influence in the self-proclaimed state is slightly above zero (except 6 Romanian schools). The ecclesiastical authorities of Transnistria firmly remain true to the Moscow Patriarchate and even the ruling bishop (contrary to the Thomos) is appointed by the Patriarch of Moscow. This situation is fully in accordance with geopolitical choice of the self-proclaimed Transnistrian Republic to stay within Russian sphere of influence.

Conclusion

So far, the attempts to bring the geoecclesiastical conflict to its end were not successful. Failing negotiations, most likely, indicate that this debate over canonical territories has a strong geopolitical underpinning. The Romanian Orthodox Church acts as one of the instruments for building common cultural space for Romania and Moldova where Romania would dominate. As a result, belonging to the Romanian Church seems to predetermine the political position of a believer. Vice versa, those remaining within the Moscow Patriarchate are expected to share pro-Russian political stand and to be in Russian sphere of influence. However, geoecclesiastical reality not necessarily repeats the geopolitical disposition. For example, relations between the Churches of Russia and Georgia remained friendly even in during the 2008 armed conflict between the two states. Moldova represents

1 Ibid. – P. 253.
ВЗАИМООТНОШЕНИЕ В УКРАИНСКОМ ПРАВОСЛАВИИ В УСЛОВИЯХ СОЦИАЛЬНО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО КРИЗИСА: РОВЕНСКИЙ МЕМОРАНДУМ

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Ровно, Украина

Постановка проблемы в общем виде и ее взаимосвязь с важными научными и практическими задачами. На современном этапе своего существования Украина столкнулась с новыми проблемами окружающего мира: экономический и политический кризис, рост цен на продукты питания и жилищно-коммунального хозяйства, необъявленная война на Востоке страны, которые заводят в тупик развитие Украины. Общество, которое устало от политических баталий и обещаний, хочет мира и стабильности. Люди ищут защитника в лице церкви. Этот религиозный институт держит уровень доверия на высоте – почти 70 % (по данным КМИС – Киевского международного института социологии на февраль – июнь 2013 г.), несмотря на достаточно непростую ситуацию и внутри самой церкви. Проблемой религиозной среды в стране является раскол православной церкви. Дело в том, что в Украине нету единой поместной церкви, а среди трех православных конфессий – УПЦ МП (Украинская православная церковь Московский патриархат), УПЦ КП (Украинская православная церковь Киевский патриархат) и УАПЦ (Украинская автокефальная православная церковь) отсутствует единое понимание получения автокефалии, и как следствие, каждая выдвигает свои условия. Этот процесс длится уже более 22 лет и, увы, не принес положительных результатов. Политики пытаются использовать церковь в своих целях, таких как завоевание власти, путем привлечения верующих, симпатизирующих определенной конфессии. Например, на президентских выборах 1994 года – Л. Кравчук проявлял лояльность к УПЦ КП (впрочем, он это делал и раньше), а Л. Кучма – УПЦ МП, что говорит о достаточно выраженной вовлеченности церкви в политический процесс.

Если мы вспомним, что религиозная жизнь на Украине в 90-х гг. ХХ в. характеризовалась захватом храмов, то в 2014 г. есть случаи перехода из одной юрисдикции в другую (из УПЦ МП в УПЦ КП) на добровольной основе. Особенно заметны тен-